Philosophy split from a time-travel thread

[bo198214]

More importantly, does anyone have suggestions for more axioms, ... ?

You forgot the axiom: Only in organic substances consciousness can emerge. (I get really aggressive if someone is so narrow-minded to tell me that. Nonetheless there are some philosophers that really assume it.)

[PWrong]

You forgot the axiom: Only in organic substances consciousness can emerge. (I get really aggressive if someone is so narrow-minded to tell me that. Nonetheless there are some philosophers that really assume it.)

Good idea. That makes 7 axioms. If I get a few more I'll make a new list.

Because the quality of feeling cannot be observed for others it can only observed for myself (by definition!).

It seems that a lot of your argument depends on this statement. Maybe this should be another axiom about "feeling" and "observing".

Axiom 8a. "feeling" is required to be conscious.

Axiom 8b. If an entity feels something, then it can observe the fact that it is feeling, and hence know that it is conscious.

Axiom 8c. Given any two distinct conscious entities, one cannot "observe" that the other "feels" anything.

Now I believe you're claiming that these three axioms prove that you can "know" you are conscious, but that I can never "know" you are conscious.

But even if "feeling" can't be detected by an observer, "knowledge" can.
If you know you felt something, then you must have felt something. If I can detect the fact that you know you felt something, and therefore conclude that you actually felt something. If I can't conclude that, neither can you, so either 8b or 8c is false.

[bo198214]

But even if "feeling" can't be detected by an observer, "knowledge" can.

But then you have to include knowledge into your axiom system.
And the axiom:
9. one can objectively determine the knowledge of a given system

It should already be difficult to define knowledge for non-humans.
Here comes again into play the I may perceive something about the knowledge of an other person, if I can in some kind connect/communicate with a system. But its already difficult if the other system speaks another language and it depends on the observer (for example if he speaks the language).

[moonlord]

"A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it." Its a statement of Max Planck and shows how safe scientific views are.

Not necessary true. I'll give one counter-example:
Albert Einstein: "God does not play dice"
Stephen W Hawking: "Not only does God play dice, but... he sometimes throws them where they cannot be seen."

Hawking's point of view seems more close to reality than Einstein's, as QM shows. Also take into consideration Einstein himself said he did not believe in QM...

Interesting though, that this thread was initially related to time-travel...

[bo198214]

Though the citation of Max Planck may be regarding relativistics, I think its generally true. I never said or meant anywhere that Einstein is/was always right. Relativistics is a mere example for the citatation. And your "counter-example" is indeed a confirmation for that these.

[moonlord]

Sorry, I'm so tired I forgot to read it in context... Oh well... Got to get some sleep. :?

[PWrong]

It should already be difficult to define knowledge for non-humans.

Not really. Here's the definition of knowledge that I use for my "proof" that axiom 8 is inconsistent. If you disagree with this definition, I'll use a different word.

You know a statement is true if the truth of that statement has somehow revealed itself to you (through logic/observation) and you can have no doubt about its truth. Note, that's different from, "you have no doubt about its truth". Rocks clearly don't know anything. Most computer programs will believe anything a human tells them, so you could say they don't really know anything. But you could also say they know that "we told them this", and they know that "If all their input is correct, then their output is true". A more sophisticated program would take input from other sources, and develop knowledge just like a human.

A more common definition would be something like "if you believe it, and it's true, then you know it." But this makes it impossible to verify knowledge, as well as assuming the existence of an objective truth (which I do, but many don't).

We don't need to define "observation" and "feel". But we can assume that any entity can make an observation, but only a conscious entity can "feel" something.

Here comes again into play the I may perceive something about the knowledge of an other person, if I can in some kind connect/communicate with a system. But its already difficult if the other system speaks another language and it depends on the observer (for example if he speaks the language).

To be true, axiom 8c has to apply for every pair of conscious entities. Thus, all we need to do to prove it false is to find a single counterexample. So you might say, "what if they speak different languages", but I say "what if they don't?".

I might try to put my objection another way. You claim that you know that you're conscious, because you feel things in a way that a robot wouldn't. Furthermore, I can never know that you're conscious, because I can't prove that you feel things in this way. Even if you tell me, for all I know you could be lying, or just programmed to tell me that.

But do you know that you were conscious 10 minutes ago? The only proof you have is a memory of feeling something 10 minutes ago. But for all you know, that memory could have been implanted there. Furthermore, if I could somehow extract your memory, you would have no more evidence for consciousness than I do. If you decide that a memory is sufficient evidence, then I can prove you are conscious.

Now there's nothing special about memory, it's just easier to understand here. My argument works just as well for one second ago, or right now. Simply replace "memory" with "experience". Note that your argument depended on the idea that we "feel" our "observations", but my argument depends on the fact that we must also "observe" our "feelings".

[thigle]

Note that your argument depended on the idea that we "feel" our "observations", but my argument depends on the fact that we must also "observe" our "feelings".

while former is talking about consciousness, the latter talks about self-consciousness (consciousness that takes itself as its object).